Mass Nouns, Count Nouns and Non-Count Laycock – – In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. A crucial part of Taurek’s argument is his contention that i. John M. Taurek, ” Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 4. (Summer I ). Oxford University Press USA publishes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, children’s books, business books, dictionaries, reference.
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In particular, I shall argue that a nonconsequentialist can permit aggregation and still respect the separateness of persons.
“Should the Numbers Count?” by John M. Taurek : philosophy
At the same time, a world in which A survives and B dies seems just as bad as a world in which A dies and B survives.
However, even many vount consequentialists think that numbers skepticism goes too far in rejecting the claim that you ought to save the greater number.
Therefore, it seems that one should reject PAI since it has this implication. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him. Encouraging other users to commit suicide, even in the abstract, is strictly forbidden. Request removal from index. I have space to offer just one example that illustrates this stalemate. The moral importance of selecting people randomly. In i A, B, and C each have tauek arms restored; they are prevented from continuing to endure the same harm.
See also Timmermann, “The Individualist Lottery,” op. Sign in to use this feature. No keywords specified fix it. The Morality of Freedom. Again, that there are five lives versus one is one consideration in this matter.
Echoing Rawls’s discussion of this matter, Robert Nozick explains the problem of making a person undergo some sacrifice for some ‘overbalancing’ good: And when doing so, the gate towards infinite regression is then opened. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 4: Google Drive links and link shorteners are aturek allowed. Saving people and flipping coins. Additionally, nothing that I will claim depends upon these notions being non-vague. How to be consistent without saving the greater number.
The procedure that holds for A given that A was chosen in round 1 likewise holds mutatis mutandis for B and C. Kavka – – Philosophical Studies 36 3: In iv A has no limbs restored and Susan has both arms restored as well as one leg restored.
All posts must be in English. Of course, pro-number nonconsequentialists have shied away from aggregation because they think that it violates the separateness of persons. This is precisely why Taurek thinks that it is permissible to simply choose to save the smaller group without choosing whom to save on the basis of a chance procedure that gives the larger group a greater chance of being saved.
For coubt purposes of this paper, however, I will mostly focus on the three views mentioned above. To learn more about what is and is not considered philosophy for the purposes of this subreddit, see our FAQ. For a critique of some of these defenses, see Otsuka, Wasserman and StrudlerLiaoand Doggett Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3: Willenken argues that we ought to accept commonsense morality rather than endorse the following Strongest reason thesis: Still, advocates of the weighted lottery could just bite the bullet and assert that this is shiuld is required to solve the Number Problem.
Suppose A is in danger of breaking his finger and B is in danger of losing her life. The Numbers Should Count. Users with a history of such comments may be banned. Hence, to deal with some of the implications of aggregation, arguably nonconsequentialists have resources to constrain aggregation without rejecting it. John Taurek argues that you do not have an obligation to save the greater number.
Fortunately, pro-number nonconsequentialists can avoid the Separateness of Persons Objection by rejecting the particular view of separateness of persons that underlies this objection.
In this paper, I shall argue that pro-number nonconsequentialists may be making the task more difficult than necessary and that there may be a simpler nonconsequentialist solution to the Number Problem. Nonconsequentialists who do not want to aggregate the claims of the many, because it seems to violate the separateness of persons — and who, at the same time, do not accept, as Taurek does, that numbers do not matter — have in recent years advanced several novel solutions to the Number Problem.
On the other hand, if the well-being of x and y are equal in comparison prior to any intervention by S, and the harm nubmers S can prevent for x is serious but the harm conut S can prevent for y is not serious, then S ought to aid x rather than y: Other things being equal, e. You only have time to go to one of the islands to rescue the people on it. I’m not quite a fan of this piece because the author spends a great deal dealing with hypotheticals.
Sgould, numbers, and probabilities. Comments which are clearly not in direct response to the posted content may be removed.
The Kamm-Scanlon Argument and the Weighted Lottery Argument I begin by giving an overview of two of the best known pro-number coujt solutions: Second, if the well-being of x and y are equal in comparison prior to any intervention by S, and the harm that S can prevent for both is serious, then the claims of both x and y are not to be dismissed even if the harm that S can prevent for x is greater in comparison to the harm that S can prevent for y to a non-trivial tye Why not, similarly, hold that some person has to bear some costs that benefit another person, as long as the good of one individual is equivalent to that of another?
There is a harm that is more serious to a nontrivial degree being prevented in iv where Susan has three limbs restored in comparison to i in which A has only two limbs restored.
All posts must develop and defend a substantive philosophical thesis. Posts must be about philosophy proper, rather than only tangentially connected to philosophy.
I take Timmerman In such a case, we would toss a coin to give each an equal chance.